It wasn't a conspiracy on the part of the Bush Administration. It was far worse!
How could the government deny knowing this possibility of a massive attack using jetliners as bombs existed, yet be able to name the alleged hijackers almost instantly because these individuals had been under surveillance for months?
If they could name the alleged hijackers, then they couldn't deny
knowing the possibility of using planes as weapons existed, could they?
Bush, not long before 9/11 changed hotels on a trip he made to Italy to attend a conference because the Secret Service feared they could not protect the first hotel as well as they could the one Bush did stay in from attacks using an aircraft to hit the building.
The hotel Bush at which Bush stayed in Sarasota, Florida on the night of 9/10 had anti-aircraft batteries on its roof, installed by the Secret Service. It wasn’t in many newspapers, but I live in Sarasota and saw it! Bush came to read “MY Pet Goat” to elementary school children here in Sarasota, which he was doing as Michael Moore pointed out, while the attacks were occurring!
In Michael Moore’s film, the fact that there was a security conference going on in New York on the very morning of 9/11 aimed at formatting what procedure would be taken by our Federal Government if just such an attack were to occur and advising Bush of the meeting through Condolisa Rice’s famous “President’s morning briefing” which was finally disclosed after the Bush team lied about it existing to the Congressional hearings and the American public for months!
Here is an article from the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists:
March/April 2003, Volume 59, No. 2, pp. 28-37
“Slow-walked and stonewalled”
By John Prados
The administration’s near-gag order assured a less-than-satisfactory outcome to the congressional investigation of 9/11.
From the day after September 11, 2001, when the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, D.C. took place, it was clear there would be a congressional investigation of the intelligence aspects of the disaster. Unanswered questions loomed in everyone’s minds: Who were the men who had seized airliners in flight and driven them into huge buildings? How had they eluded sophisticated American security systems? And what warning, if any, had there been?
It took some time to agree on the form the inquiry might take, but at length the issue was settled, and the examination was completed in December 2002. Oddly enough, given the magnitude of the attacks and the importance of learning how they could have happened, the inquiry attracted startlingly little attention.
How did that happen? It is important to understand how the investigation was conducted, how it became sidetracked
, and what the process can tell us, not only about the workings of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and its intelligence cohorts, but also about Bush administration policy and politics.
The shape of things to come
For nearly three decades after its creation, the peacetime U.S. intelligence community functioned in silence—in the shadows, as the spies are fond of saying. That was not so much because the work was inherently secret, but because there was broad public consensus at the height of the Cold War that intelligence activities were necessary and appropriate. During the time of the Vietnam war, however, that consensus began to erode, partly due to revelations of questionable activities, some in Vietnam, but others in the United States and elsewhere; partly due to Watergate-induced suspicion of the government, and partly due to the lessening of Cold War hostility between the United States and Russia (then the Soviet Union). Over the years there have been a succession of major investigations of the CIA and related matters.
The first investigation began in 1975, triggered by reports that the CIA was involved in assassinations abroad and illegal spying at home. In 1975 there was a presidential commission under Vice President Nelson A. Rockefeller to look into the domestic activities of intelligence, as well as inquiries by separate investigating committees in both the Senate and the House of Representatives. The Senate inquiry, headed by Idaho Republican Frank Church, is remembered today mostly to accuse it—unjustly—of various excesses; in fact, the committee labored hard to investigate without alienating. The House inquiry, headed by New York congressman Otis Pike, is largely forgotten, but was far more contentious at the time. Efforts to write law codifying charters for the CIA and other agencies failed. The main results of the 1975 investigations were the establishment of intelligence committees in both houses of Congress, an oversight arrangement that continues today; passage of a law (the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, recently in the news); and promulgation of a presidential executive order prohibiting assassination.1
A little more than a decade later, in 1986, the discovery that proceeds from illegal arms sales had been diverted to rebel fighters supported by a CIA covert action led to a fresh controversy. White House officials, specifically National Security Council (NSC) staffers, had orchestrated both arms sales and rebel aid, and intelligence agencies had had a supporting role (witting or unwitting) at many levels. This became known as the Iran-contra affair. Investigations of these excesses included one by a presidential commission headed by past (and future) national security adviser Brent Scowcroft, inquiries by the House and Senate intelligence committees, a joint committee established by Congress (there had also been joint committees to investigate Watergate and, just after World War II, the intelligence failure at Pearl Harbor), and a special prosecutor created under investigative provisions instituted after Watergate. The last acts of the Iran-contra drama did not take place until 1992, when a number of former officials—including convicted felons—were pardoned by the current president’s father.
The major results of the political crisis were new strictures on CIA reporting to Congress on its covert operations.2
Overlapping with the Iran-contra affair were hearings on the CIA that took place in 1991, on the occasion of the appointment of Robert W. Gates to be director of central intelligence (DCI). Gates, then serving as deputy national security adviser (under Scowcroft), had been deputy director of central intelligence. He was accused by CIA officers of slanting the agency’s products to benefit the policies he favored.
That allegation resulted in a series of hearings before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. There were no programmatic results of the Gates nomination hearings, but the present DCI, George W. Tenet, was at that time a member of the staff of the Senate committee.
This is the background against which the September 11 investigation should be seen. Looking back, there have been periodic major inquiries into intelligence matters, as well as a rough correspondence between the perceived severity of excess and the scale of the investigations.
From the beginning the avenues available for the latest investigation were clear. There could be committee investigations by either or both houses of Congress, a joint congressional committee, or a blue ribbon commission. From the outset, President George W. Bush expressed no interest in a commission
. When legislation authorizing a commission was first offered late in 2001, the military campaign in Afghanistan was at its height, and that fact was used to argue that investigations would distract the war managers. On January 29, 2002, when Bush spoke to Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle, a White House spokesman told the press, “The president thinks it’s important for Congress to review events in a way that does not unduly burden the defense and intelligence communities, as they are still charged with fighting a war.”3
The above is just a small part of an article written by John Prados
which appeared in the March/April 2003 edition of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists on pages 28-37 (vol. 59, no. 02) in 2003. You can read the rest here:http://www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art_ofn=ma03prados
From the facts stated in this article and from numerous other sources - from Congressional hearings to a variety of disclosures by members of the Bush Administration who could no longer tolerate the administration’s lying and deceit, we can only come up with the conclusion that the Bushies were covering up their blatant ineptitude and malfeasance in office, not a conspiracy to attack America and destroy the WTC.
And yet, after disclosure after disclosure proving the Bush Administration was incompetent and deceitful for so many things they did and in so many ways, we, the American public elected Bush again anyway.